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Theresa May’s speech today outlined five major conditions that she 
felt any Brexit deal had to fulfil.  She argued first and foremost that 
any deal must “respect the referendum result”.  Nevertheless, it is not 
clear precisely what any given deal must do in order to pass this.  In 
part this is due to the way in which the referendum question was 
framed: whilst a modest majority of voters voted against remaining in 
the EU, it is much less clear what, precisely, they were 
voting for.  Whilst migration was of paramount importance for many 
leave voters, others would perhaps be content to remain within the 
European Economic Area and Customs Union for the purported 
economic benefits.  For still others, fishing will have been the key 
issue and for many a, perhaps somewhat amorphous, desire for 
greater (British) sovereignty or repatriation of powers. 
In some cases, a degree of confusion between the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU may have played a 
part.  The case of Abu Qatada, for example, has been raised by a 
number of people we have spoken to.  In any event, for each of these 
groups, the key contours of Brexit will have meant something different 
and it is unclear how to translate these very individual conceptions 
into how to “respect the referendum result” in aggregate. 
The second major test – that any agreement reached should stand 
the test of time – is perhaps better founded.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the UK’s involvement with the EU is likely to evolve over time as 
are the wishes of her people (demographic change alone is will see to 
that).  As to the remainder of the conditions there is a strong argument 
to be made that they are somewhat vacuous.  “Protecting jobs” is a 
fantastic political soundbite, but the overwhelming majority of 
available evidence suggests that labour market conditions (and 
particularly unemployment) are largely the result of domestic 
policy.  The economic arguments over Brexit are rather over the 
impact on living standards and quality of jobs. 
Likewise, it’s hard to see how a political agreement can lead to a 
Britain that is “modern, open, outward-looking and tolerant”.  In fact, it 
is not at all clear what such phraseology even means (what is a 
“modern” Britain?  What brand of “tolerance” is a trade deal supposed 
to encourage?  Are we to be tolerant of those views which we find 
uncomfortable or abhorrent?) 
Finally, Theresa May’s assertion that an agreement must “strengthen 
the precious union of our people” is deeply problematic.  It is far from 
clear what the government (or, indeed, the devolved administrations) 
has done to address the problem of a vote in which Scotland voted 
overwhelmingly to remain part of the EU (as did London) but most of 
England voted equally passionately to leave.  Indeed, we do not even 
yet fully understand why the constituent parts of the UK voted 
differently, let alone how to address those differences.  The situation 
in Northern Ireland is even more serious with the vote appearing to 
divide primarily along religious lines (as with so much else). 
Nevertheless, a number of parts of the speech were clearly designed 
to appease critics of the Government’s policy, both at home and 
abroad.  Her statement on the Irish border, namely that “[w]e chose to 
leave and we have a responsibility to help find a solution” is likely to 
find favour amongst those within the EU (including the Irish 
government) who have hitherto shown frustration with the 
administration. 
The speech also pointed to an ongoing “blurring” of some of the UK 
Government’s red-lines, particularly regarding the role of the Court of 
Justice of the EU.  It is thus far unclear whether the Prime Minister will 
be able to convince her European colleagues to support her vision of 
third-party arbitration.  It is unclear what Theresa May would be able 
to offer in order to induce them to do so, although an “EFTA” style 
court seems the most likely option if agreed. 
The notion of “reciprocal binding commitments” to ensure fair 
competition may yet prove problematic for those wishing to “take back 
control”.  Ultimately, this comes against the same dilemma that the UK 
(and others) have always faced – there is a trade-off between 
sovereignty and frictionless trade.  The same is, of course, true of the 
Prime Minister’s ambition to retain “substantially similar” regulatory 
standards on goods.  In fact, this commitment to fair competition is 
one area where the UK Government appears closer to its European 
counterparts than the opposition Labour Party. 
The details of her recent speech did lay out a number of areas where 
policy has evolved.  In particular, the Government appears much 
keener on retaining membership (albeit some form of “associate” 
membership) of a variety of EU agencies.  To a large extent this 
appears sensible and pragmatic – it is difficult to see how dropping 
out of the European Aviation Safety Agency or European Medicines 
Agency would be in the UK’s national interests.  Maintaining most 
elements of Open Skies is an obvious imperative. 
The Government’s acknowledgement of the importance of cross-
border supply chains is very welcome.  Equally, it is unclear how the 
Customs Partnership envisaged by the Prime Minister would 
ultimately be enforced.  What is to stop third parties fraudulently using 
the UK in order to access the European market with reduced 
tariffs?  Or, indeed, vice versa.  It was interesting that the Government 
appears to have abandoned any hope of obtaining passporting rights 
for the financial services sector, instead relying on some form of 
equivalence and mutual recognition that has yet to be specified. 
In sum, the UK’s position has evolved substantially over the course of 
negotiations and the latest speech by the Prime Minister embodies 
this.  Ultimately, considerable pragmatism will be needed and as the 
junior partner the UK will need to accept the vast majority of the EU’s 
requirements.  Nevertheless, the UK does appear to be moving 
towards a situation in which the trade-off between the complete 
sovereignty desired by many proponents of Brexit and frictionless 
trade is at least made explicit.  What is less clear is how the continued 
sticking point of Northern Ireland can be addressed outside of a full 
Customs Union and thus ongoing primacy of EU standards, including 
the role of the ECJ as arbiter of these. 
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